I n psychiatry, prevalence has become a controversial topic. Prevalence is an epidemiologic parameter representing the number with, or frequency of, a health condition in a specified population at a designated point (point prevalence) or period (period prevalence) in time. As with all epidemiologic parameters, prevalence estimation is subject to error. In turn, error can be random (that is, owing to sampling variability) or systematic (that is, that contributing to bias). When described in this way, prevalence seems an unlikely candidate to attract controversy. Existing research methods can deal with the issues of sampling variability and bias by application of correct procedures for statistical analysis, subject selection, and measurement. However, as the 2 articles in this month's In Review 1,2 demonstrate, the issue of prevalence inflation is not merely a technical problem. On the contrary, prevalence inflation and the related issue of diagnostic expansion are multifaceted problems entangled with value judgments, economic and political interests, and strongly held opinions.
Dr Joseph M Pierre's review 1 focuses largely on the arbitrary nature of nosological distinctions, emphasizing those made between depressive disorders, adjustment disorders, complicated bereavement, uncomplicated bereavement, and V codes. Dr Philip B Mitchell's review 2 is specifically concerned with the boundaries of bipolar disorder (BD).
In the first review, Dr Pierre 1 argues that the current trend toward diagnostic expansion has legitimate roots in the history of psychiatry, resulting from historical and professional events that have brought attention to an increasingly broad range of psychopathology. Dr Pierre emphasizes the existence of a spectrum of illness severity and, indeed, a spectrum of human experience that extends beyond the boundaries of psychopathology into the domain of wellness. Attempts to categorize such experiences will inevitably involve arbitrary elements and can, therefore, be problematic. From this perspective, the value of psychiatric expertise need not be restricted to the illness domain at all, but can be usefully extended to the pursuit of wellness and even employed for neuroenhancement. In essence, Dr Pierre's review dispenses with concerns about diagnostic expansion and prevalence inflation through acceptance that, at some level, the prevalence of potential targets for psychiatric intervention is 100%. Dr Mitchell 2 adopts a different perspective. Focusing specifically on BD, he emphasizes problems that can arise when diagnostic definitions are loosened: inappropriate treatment, oversimplification and diagnostic deskilling, and, perhaps most important of all, compromised etiologic and therapeutic research. Dr Mitchell's comments also emphasize that expansion of diagnostic categories results not only results in broader categories but also in overlap (or potentially eclipsing) of some categories by other categories, for example, borderline personality disorder and bipolar spectrum disorders.
Both reviewers provide complementary perspectives. For example, Dr Pierre 1 points out that if psychiatrists are to increasingly embrace diagnostic spectra and dimensional concepts they will need to be flexible in their therapeutic approaches. This suggests that expanded diagnostic categories and broadened syndromal definitions need not necessarily lead to an expanded use of potentially ineffective treatments, a concern expressed by Dr Mitchell. 2 However, such flexibility may imply a diminished strength of the linkage between diagnosis and clinical intervention. When compared with social scientists, medical researchers have typically been quite willing to work with somewhat arbitrary categories. The continued value of diagnostic categories may relate to the real-world functions of medical practitioners, including the necessity of making treatment recommendations. It may be easier to link categories than dimensions to clinical actions, which may partially explain why even unambiguously dimensional constructs, such as blood pressure, are often categorized in medical practice. Far from apologizing for arbitrary diagnostic boundaries, Dr Mitchell 2 emphasizes the potential advantages of categorization in linking identifiable groups of patients to scientific evidence, in preserving the ability of clinicians to identify meaningfully different groups of patients and, potentially, in constraining diagnostic terminology to underlying pathophysiology. Dr Pierre offers a solution to many of these issues in a "particle and wave" 1, p 656 analogy. In principle, clinicians and researchers can make good use both of solid diagnostic definitions and of dimensional constructs. For example, this occurs in the treatment of hypertension and other conditions, such as diabetes. For such conditions, and perhaps for most conditions, there is value both in identifying a condition and in quantifying its manifestations along various dimensions. However, thinking simultaneously in categorical and dimensional terms requires rigour and discipline. As Dr Mitchell 2 points out in his careful deconstruction of some of the bipolar spectrum disorder papers, when standardized definitions are loosened, diagnostic definitions can begin to reflect the sometimes idiosyncratic beliefs of various investigators. Consequently, a widening gyre of subtle definitional differences can interfere with scientific progress, and these can be difficult for users of this information to identify and to understand.
An additional issue, worth mentioning because it does not receive emphasis in the 2 In Review papers, is an impression of prevalence inflation that results, in part, from an increasing number of conditions being included in more recent psychiatric epidemiologic surveys. Inclusion of a larger number of disorders can lead to higher overall prevalence, even when the prevalence of no specific disorder has increased. A case in point is a recent European burden of disease study that placed the 1-year prevalence of mental disorders at 38% (up more than 10% from a similar study 5 years earlier), but where the increase was attributed exclusively to a greater number of conditions being included. 3 
